DETAILED STATEMENT ON THE ROSA PARKS COAT LITIGATION

Civil rights icon Rosa Parks died in 2005 with a modest and exceedingly simple estate. It was comprised of approximately $373,000.00 in cash and had no creditors. Mrs. Parks, who did not have any children, had a detailed estate plan in force that devised her entire estate to her friend, Elaine Steele, and the charity they established together in 1987, the Rosa and Raymond Parks Institute for Self Development.

Unfortunately, however, Mrs. Parks' 12 nieces and nephews (who were not beneficiaries of Mrs. Parks' estate) filed a baseless will and trust contest. The first action taken by the presiding judge, Hon. Freddie G. Burton, Jr., was the removal, without proper notice, proceedings or cause, of the estate fiduciaries appointed by Mrs. Parks (Steele and former 36th District Court judge Adam Shakoor), and the installation of two fiduciaries ***recommended by the nieces and nephews***, John Chase, Jr. and Melvin Jefferson, Jr. Chase and Jefferson then inserted themselves into the litigation (as to which they completely lacked all standing, interest and authority) and proceeded to charge grossly excessive fees for legal "services" that were wholly unnecessary, over $106,000.00 in the first year alone.

The litigation was settled by the parties in a confidential settlement agreement executed in March of 2007 that confirmed the validity and enforceability of Mrs. Parks' estate plan. The settlement stipulated that Steele and the Institute (80%) and the nieces and nephews (20%) would divide the net proceeds from the sale of a valuable civil rights artifact collection that Mrs. Parks had given to the Institute before her death. In order to enhance the historical and economic value of the artifact collection, the nieces and

nephews promised to deliver for inclusion in the collection the famous wool coat worn by Mrs. Parks on the date of her arrest in Alabama.

Judge Burton insinuated himself deeply into the settlement negotiations, even suggesting the use of critical language that was eventually incorporated into the settlement agreement. Later, when Judge Burton was called upon to interpret the agreement, he repeatedly used his ***own understanding*** of the language he suggested and his ***own personal observations*** about the negotiations to render dispositive rulings against Steele and the Institute, without ever conducting a trial or evidentiary proceedings of any kind.

The settlement agreement explicitly required the prompt removal of Chase and Jefferson and their replacement with Steele and Shakoor. Despite this, Chase and Jefferson continued in their fiduciary offices for the next five years while Judge Burton blocked repeated efforts by Steele and the Institute to have them removed. Over this period, Judge Burton awarded Chase and Jefferson over $400,000.00 in administrative and attorney fees, in an estate having a gross value of only $373,000.00. What was particularly incredible about these excessive fee awards is that there was absolutely nothing for Chase and Jefferson to do in an estate holding only cash and having no creditors.

Judge Burton demonstrated great creativity in awarding these excessive fees. In 2011, he awarded $87,000.00 in fees to his cronies in a proceeding in which he ***expressly barred Steele and the Institute, the sole beneficiaries of the estate, from contesting the request for fees.*** In 2010, Judge Burton entered a ***personal judgment*** against Steele and the Institute for fees in excess of $120,000.00 on a ***purely oral request*** by

Chase and Jefferson. As recently acknowledged by Chase, this judgment was entered ***in express fulfillment of a corrupt promise made by Judge Burton three years earlier***. According to Chase, in 2007 he and Jefferson were in possession of approximately $120,000.00 in intellectual property royalties belonging to the Institute, which had erroneously been deposited into the estate. Chase and Jefferson recognized that they had no right to possess these funds and that they had an absolute obligation to distribute them to the Institute. Before distributing the funds, however, they conducted an *ex parte* conference in Judge Burton's chambers in which he explicitly promised, despite lacking jurisdiction over these non-probate funds, that he would recover these funds from the Institute at a later time if Chase and Jefferson requested them for the payment of their fees.

Not content with bankrupting the estate over time with their excessive fees, Chase and Jefferson concocted a petition against Steele and the Institute based on a false allegation that they had improperly disclosed material from the confidential settlement agreement. The petition was facially absurd. Chase and Jefferson did not have standing to bring the breach of contract action because they were not parties to the 2007 settlement agreement. Chase and Jefferson did not identify any clause in the settlement that was disclosed (because none was disclosed), nor did they identify any person who heard the phantom disclosure. The petition demanded ***imprisonment*** of Steele and the Institute for this phantom breach of contract and the forfeiture of their interests in the estate.

Despite its fatal flaws, Judge Burton granted the petition and used the false allegation of breach of confidentiality to confiscate Steele and the Institute's entire beneficial interest in the estate and award it to Chase and Jefferson. Judge Burton

also confiscated separate property belonging to the Institute -- publicity rights and civil rights artifacts worth millions of dollars that were never part of the estate and over which the probate court had no jurisdiction -- and awarded it to Chase and Jefferson.

Judge Burton has admitted having entered all of the above fee awards, judgments and confiscation orders without conducting a single evidentiary hearing or trial, allowing discovery or hearing a dispositive motion, in gross violation of constitutional due process, fundamental fairness and basic court rules. In addition, Judge Burton has admitted having repeatedly entered into the litigation as a witness and an advocate, supplying his own testimony and argument in support of his corrupt orders and refusing to allow Steele and the Institute to introduce a scrap of evidence in opposition to his corrupt rulings.

Steele and the Institute prosecuted years of appellate proceedings to correct Judge Burton's rulings, at unfathomable expense and risk of their own personal liberty. During two and one-half years of appellate proceedings, Judge Burton threatened Steele and the Institute and their attorney, Steven G. Cohen, over a dozen times with contempt of court and ***imprisonment*** for purely imagined transgressions as minor as using the wrong court forms.

In December of 2011, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed all of Judge Burton's confiscation orders, and ordered the return of all of Steele and the Institute's property and estate interests. And, in recognition of their misconduct, the Court ordered the immediate discharge of Chase and Jefferson from their fiduciary offices and the reinstatement of Steele and Shakoor.

In response to these Supreme Court orders, Judge Burton again entered the litigation, this time as an express advocate for Chase and Jefferson, ***arguing in a written document filed in the Supreme Court for reconsideration of the Court's discharge of Chase and Jefferson.*** The Supreme Court curtly dismissed Judge Burton's reconsideration request and repeated its instruction to immediately remove Chase and Jefferson.

In a coordinated action with Judge Burton, Chase and Jefferson also filed a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court's reversal order. Ironically, they attached the entire confidential settlement agreement to their motion without first obtaining an order keeping the agreement under court seal as Steele and the Institute had always done. The Detroit Free Press obtained from the Supreme Court file the unsealed settlement agreement, and published it on their web site.

A few months later, Judge Burton ***unsealed the settlement agreement on his own motion***, in an obvious attempt to immunize Chase and Jefferson's improper disclosure. ***Thus, while Judge Burton issued a virtual death sentence against Steele and the Institute for a phantom disclosure of an unidentified portion of the settlement agreement to unidentified persons, he treated an actual disclosure of the entire settlement agreement by Chase and Jefferson to the public at large as an occasion to unseal the settlement.***

In May of 2012, in order to recover the excessive fees awarded to Chase and Jefferson during their improper prosecution of the confiscation proceedings, Steele and the Institute filed a surcharge petition charging Chase, Jefferson and Judge Burton with multiple breaches of their fiduciary and judicial duties. The petition contains extensive

documentation of Judge Burton's misconduct, precisely mirroring the factual background and allegations of misconduct contained in the successful Supreme Court appellate brief. Steele and the Institute also filed a motion for judicial disqualification which contains additional allegations of judicial misconduct and expressly incorporates the factual allegations of the surcharge petition. In continuation of his pattern of summary decision making, Judge Burton dismissed the surcharge petition and denied the motion, without notice, proceedings, evidence, hearing or trial.

Steele and the Institute took an appeal of these orders to the Michigan Supreme Court in April of 2014. The appeal was never heard because all of the interested parties in the estate signed a global settlement agreement in June of 2014. With one exception (the coat controversy, discussed below) this settlement agreement settled each and every issue then pending and reinstated Elaine Steele and Adam Shakoor as fiduciaries. Adam Shakoor subsequently resigned, leaving Steele as the sole remaining fiduciary for the probate estate and the trust although, due to Chase and Jefferson's rapacity, there were no assets left in the estate for Steele to administer.

At about the same time, the Institute entered into an agreement for the purchase of Mrs. Parks' civil rights artifacts by philanthropist Howard Buffett for the amount of $4,500,000.00. The Institute received 80% of the net sales proceeds, and the family members received 20% of the net proceeds, as stipulated in the 2007 settlement agreement, even though the family members never performed their obligation to deliver Mrs. Parks' famous wool coat, which would have immeasurably enhanced the financial and historical value of the collection.

In 2013, Steele and the Institute filed a complaint against the nieces and nephews in Wayne County Circuit Court for breach of their promise to deliver the coat. The action was erroneously transferred to Judge Burton's court, even though the action involved property – the coat – that was not part of Mrs. Parks' probate estate. Four years later, Judge Burton improperly barred Steele and the Institute from having a jury trial of the matter and then ruled that the coat was worthless, despite uncontroverted evidence that the coat was worth $1,350,000.00. This decision is currently on appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals.

Despite his long history of misconduct on the bench, Judge Burton has found an unlikely ally in attorney Robert Edick, deputy administrator for the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC). Edick has spent more than a decade as chief apologist for Judge Burton and other judges of the Wayne County probate court. Over 10 years ago, then assistant chief probate judge David Szymanski attempted to intimidate attorney Cohen in a case unrelated to the Parks estate by threatening, during a public hearing, to "Bury you in a hole and throw in the dirt". After Cohen brought this unsavory remark to the attention of the chief probate judge Edick took it upon himself to file a formal misconduct complaint against . . . Cohen for, in essence, making true but embarrassing allegations of judicial misconduct against judge Szymanski. Edick actually prosecuted the misconduct charge in a trial before a panel of the Michigan Attorney Discipline Board (ADB), but received an embarrassing result when the panel threw the case out for lack of merit before Cohen even completed his defense testimony.

A few years later, Edick saw another chance to punish Cohen for disclosing judicial misconduct in the probate court. In November of 2012, Chase and Jefferson, after having

been removed from their fiduciary offices by the Supreme Court in the Parks estate, retaliated against Cohen by filing a grievance with the AGC charging Cohen with filing numerous false and frivolous pleadings in the estate, including: (1) the successful Supreme Court brief; (2) the surcharge petition that was summarily dismissed by Judge Burton; and (3) the disqualification motion that was also summarily dismissed. The grievance correctly asserts that the surcharge petition and the disqualification motion contain virtually identical factual allegations as the successful Supreme Court brief.

Two years later, the AGC filed a formal complaint against Cohen charging misconduct in the filing of the surcharge petition and motion for disqualification. The AGC declined to charge misconduct against Cohen in connection with the successful Supreme Court brief, or to mention the successful results obtained by Cohen throughout his lengthy representation in the Parks estate litigation.

The formal complaint quotes allegations of gross judicial misconduct from the two charged pleadings, completely out-of-context and without reference to the extensive factual support contained therein. The complaint does not state ***why*** these criticisms of Judge Burton comprise attorney misconduct. ***Most incredibly, the complaint does not identify a single factual allegation in the charged pleadings as being untrue or any legal position as lacking merit. In failing to defend Judge Burton against multiple and specific allegations of gross judicial misconduct and corruption the formal complaint is more damning to Judge Burton than it is to Cohen.***

Proceedings were then conducted before a three attorney panel appointed by the ADB. At a pretrial hearing, Cohen's counsel stated that he intended to introduce extensive evidence proving the truth of all of the factual allegations made in the petition

and the motion. The panel chairperson responded that, ***"I don't know that truth is necessarily relevant. I'm looking at the petition and it's fairly straightforward."*** Tr., February 11, 2016, Pg. 7. (All transcript references herein are to proceedings conducted in Administrator v Cohen, ADB Case No. 15-28-GA.)

Out of concern over this strange pronouncement, Cohen filed a pretrial motion seeking a ruling that the truth of the statements in the charged documents is a defense to all of the charges in the complaint. Cohen also filed a summary disposition motion asserting that the complaint failed to give Cohen adequate notice of the specific ***legal and factual*** allegations supporting the charges. At a pretrial hearing conducted on March 7, 2016, the panel refused to rule on the pretrial motion and summarily denied Cohen's summary disposition motion without discussion, analysis or clarification.

During the pretrial hearing, the panel took the opportunity to double-down on its apparent insistence on a fact-free proceeding, stating that it would never render any finding that Judge Burton acted in an improper manner, the heart of the allegations set forth in the charged pleadings and the primary basis of Cohen's defense to the charges:

> Chairperson Zagorski: We are not going to make a determination about whether the Wayne County Probate Court is corrupt. You understand that, right?
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> * * *
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> Chairperson Zagorski: So even if you call people who express the opinion that it is, that will not be the finding of this panel.
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> * * *
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> Chairperson Zagorski: Under any circumstance. Tr., March 7, 2016, Pgs. 42-43.

During the AGC's case in chief, the panel chairperson continued to make declarations announcing her complete disinterest in the background that led to the filing of the charged pleadings:

> Chairperson Zagorski: Right. Because we're here on the issue of whether misconduct was committed by yourself, Cohen Cohen***. We are not here to make any determinations of what happened in the probate file***, the conduct of Judge Burton. That is not before this panel. Tr., March 28, 2016, Pg. 118.

At the end of the AGC's case in chief Cohen moved for dismissal of the complaint (pursuant to MCR 2.504(B)) on the basis that AGC had failed to ***allege or prove*** that any factual assertion in the charged pleadings was untrue or that any legal argument contained in the charged documents was without merit. During oral argument, the panel made another pronouncement about its intent to ignore the truth of the allegations contained in the surcharge petition and disqualification motion:

> Chairperson Zagorski: I want to be clear about that point, because that's been repeated several times. What I have said repeatedly is that this panel is not going to make any determination regarding conspiracy existing in the Wayne County probate court. You've made that allegation. We are not going to find if that is true or not true. Does that clarify things for you?
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> Chairperson Zagorski: The truth of that allegation is not relevant to these proceedings. Tr. March 28, 2016, Pg. 238.

Ultimately, however, the panel acknowledged that the pleadings filed by Cohen were well grounded in fact and law:

> Chairperson Zagorski: ***So we acknowledge factually, legally, yep, you're fine. Improper purpose –*** Tr., March 28, 2016, Pg. 236.

Inexplicably, this finding did not result in dismissal of the petition, and the motion was denied without explanation.

During Cohen's defense case in chief, the panel repeatedly expressed its expectation that the content of the charged pleadings could be analyzed in a complete vacuum, without reference to the underlying facts in the estate. The panel also repeatedly held that the truthfulness of the charged pleadings was irrelevant to its consideration of the charges against Cohen:

Chairperson Zagorski: And that's your argument. ***This Panel is not tasked with whether Judge Burton's conduct was proper.*** That's not our job. We're not trying that case. Tr., May 13, 2016, Pgs. 71-73.

Chairperson Zagorski: ***We're not going to make a determination about Judge Burton's conduct.*** Tr., May 13, 2016, Pg. 116.

Chairperson Zagorski: We're telling you not to. ***We don't want testimony from Judge Burton about his gross misconduct.*** Tr., May 13, 2016, Pgs. 135-136.

Chairperson Zagorski: I'm not here to determine whether Judge Burton disregards his judicial duties or not. Tr., May 13, 2016, Pg. 181.

Ms. Zagorski: Okay. Let's assume that all is true. Let's assume that's what he said. He can tell us that I can do whatever I want. I don't have to follow procedure. Let's assume all that is true. How does that relate to the allegations against you? Tr., May 13, 2016, Pg. 219.

Mr. Cothorn: ***I think what you are trying to have us do is act as a fact finder. And you want us to make a determination as to whether or not your allegations against His Honor are truthful, because your defense is that if, in fact, my allegations against His Honor are truthful, then therefore, there can be no bad purpose in the filing of your petition. And the chairwoman has told you before that our function here in this hearing is not to make a determination one way or another with respect to His Honor. It is only your alleged misconduct.*** Tr., May 16, 2016, Pg. 166.

Chairperson Zagorski: ***This Panel is not going to find, for example, that – and I quote "Judge Burton makes up the rules as he goes along, without reference to laws or the wishes of the deceased person, to suit his interests and those of his cronies."*** Tr., May 16, 2016, Pg. 33-34.

Chairperson Zagorski: A different conclusion from the Court of Appeals? We are not going to – we are not here to review the Court of Appeals. Tr., May 16, 2016, Pg. 34.

Chairperson Zagorski: -- we are not going to reverse the Court of Appeals here. Tr., May 16, 2016, Pgs. 51-52.

Chairperson Zagorski: That's your argument, and we understand your argument, that's not our job. We will not issue a finding of a fact that says that Mr. Chase is corrupt. We will not issue a finding of fact that Judge Burton is corrupt.

Mr. Cohen: Will you issue a finding of fact that Mr. Chase acted improperly and violated his duties?

Chairperson Zagorski: No. Tr., June 24, 2016, Pgs. 112-113.

> Chairperson Zagorski: You've asserted that there was improper conduct on the part of the Wayne County Probate Court and some attorneys that practiced there, you will not use this tribunal to prove that case. Tr., June 24, 2016, Pg. 114.
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> Mr. Cothorn: ***I can only repeat what my colleague has said a few moments ago, in that this panel is not charged with and will not be making as a result of any of the proceedings any type of factual determination with respect to Mr. Chase, Mr. Jefferson, or Judge Burton. That is not what we have been charged to do. So if that is your expectation, that upon completion of proofs in this case that this panel is going to be rendering a decision, whether in writing or orally, that contains we find that your allegations are factually correct, that's not going to happen.*** Tr., June 24, 2016, Pgs. 118-119.

The Panel barred Cohen, without explanation, from calling expert witnesses confirming the gross misconduct of Judge Burton and the exceedingly strong factual and legal basis for the charged pleadings. Tr., 6-6-16, Pgs. 5-58. The panel also barred Cohen from introducing testimony through Judge Burton concerning the decade-long litigation over the nieces and nephews' failure to deliver the coat as promised in the 2007 settlement. Tr., 5-13-16, Pgs. 151-161. The panel ruled that it would be a conflict of interest for Judge Burton to testify to ongoing litigation over which he continued to preside. The panel gave no consideration to Cohen's argument that such conflict of interest concerns, if they actually exist, are subordinate to Cohen's right to put on a complete defense in the quasi-criminal misconduct proceedings. Despite the panel's bizarre and improper efforts to conduct a fact-free proceeding, Cohen managed to elicit testimony from Judge Burton and Chase which explicitly confirms their gross misconduct, cronyism and corrupt conspiracy.

In its misconduct report issued after the close of the evidence, the panel dismissed the charges under MRPC 3.1 (frivolous pleadings) and 3.2 (failure to expedite litigation), an implicit finding that the charged pleadings are well grounded in fact and law. The panel found Cohen in violation of the obloquy rule (MCR 9.104(2)) and the courtesy rule (MRPC

3.5(d)), without any explanation of how these rules could be violated by factually true allegations contained in non-frivolous pleadings. The panel found Cohen in violation of the frivolousness rule of MCR 2.114/5.114 without reconciling this finding with its finding that Cohen did not violate MRPC 3.1.

The panel also found misconduct under the "conduct prejudicial" rule of MRPC 8.4(c)/MCR 9.104(1) on the basis that Cohen filed the factually true, legally meritorious and certified non-frivolous surcharge action and ***judicial disqualification motion*** for the improper and secret purpose of . . . ***disqualifying the judge.*** This hair-splitting, tautological and constitutionally infirm finding is wholly unjustifiable, elevating, as it does, the unknown and unknowable purposes motivating the filing of these pleadings over their actual content, which the panel found to be factually true, legally meritorious and non-frivolous. It is a particularly cynical finding, given that the panel barred Cohen from introducing "purposes" evidence on the basis ***that the panel had already determined that 1) Cohen filed the charged pleadings in good faith and 2) only Cohen could possibly know his purposes for filing them:***

> Chairperson Zagorski: We believe you when you say you thought you had a basis for filing it. We believe you.
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> Mr. Cohen: The panel chairperson just said that you believe me.
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> Mr. Dakmak: Subjective. That you believe what you pleaded. Okay. Tr., May 16, 2016, Pg. 56-57.
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> ***Chairperson Zagorski: You're the only person who knows whether you had a proper purpose or not.*** Tr., May 13, 2016, Pg. 218.

The report does not contain anything resembling a summary of the evidence or findings of fact as required by MCR 9.115(J). Instead, the report contains an extraordinarily brief and thoroughly inadequate discussion of the "evidence" in two

paragraphs in the middle of page three. These two paragraphs contain precisely five citations to the transcript, none of which is even remotely pertinent to the charges in the formal complaint.

The report does not cite to Judge Burton's admission that he rendered conclusive findings of fact and final decisions solely on hotly contested pleadings, without evidence, motion practice, discovery, witnesses or trial. The report does not cite to Judge Burton's repeated entry into the litigation as a witness and advocate. The report does not cite to the obvious collusion and coordination between Judge Burton and his cronies.

The report does not specifically cite to the content of a single one of the hundred exhibits introduced during trial. In fact, the only document specifically referenced in the report, other than the charged pleadings, is an alleged transcript of a radio interview conducted by Cohen in 2012, ***which was never introduced into evidence, was not mentioned in the formal complaint and was expressly waived by the AGC as a basis for misconduct:***

> Chairperson Zagorski: Your objection is relevance?
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> Mr. Cohen: Sure.
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> Chairperson Zagorski: The panel would find it relevant. Are you objecting based on lack of notice?
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> Mr. Cohen: Both of them. It's the same thing. It's not relevant because it's not in the complaint. It's not in the complaint; therefore I had no notice of it.
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> Mr. Edick: We're not asking for charges of misconduct based on that statement itself. The statement, I think, is relevant. It sheds light on since it was made within a couple weeks of the filing of the conspiracy petition relevant to the Cohen's motives. Tr., 3-28-16, Pg. 103.

The report does not cite to a single statement made by Cohen on the extensive transcript. Instead, the only citations to Cohen's speech are the ***completely false***

assertions that Cohen alleged that Judge Burton is a “crook” and that Cohen “has acknowledged forum shopping”.

The panel utterly failed to state any basis whatsoever for its misconduct findings. This omission appears to be intentional, as on page three the panel states that it will not accept or consider any evidence supporting the truth of the factual allegations contained in the charged pleadings and “is unwilling to substitute its opinion for those rendered by the Wayne County Probate Court, The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court, all of which have reviewed the matter.” But, the panel refused to identify those opinions and cite the content upon which it relied, leaving Cohen to guess at the admissibility and substance of the “evidence” supporting the panel’s misconduct findings. Moreover, the assertion that any of the above courts “reviewed the matter” is false, as none of these courts had any misconduct charges before them.

In its brief filed prior to the level of discipline hearing, the AGC demanded ***disbarment*** of Cohen as a punishment for filing, in good faith, factually true, legally meritorious, certified non-frivolous pleadings. Prior to the start of testimony, the panel announced, over Cohen’s strenuous objection, that it would not consider any evidence bearing on a) the duty violated, b) the lawyer’s mental state or c) injury caused by the lawyer’s conduct, almost the entirety of the analysis required under *Grievance Administrator v Lopatin*, 462 Mich 235, 612 NW2d 120 (2000) and the ABA discipline standards. Instead, the panel announced that it was going to consider only evidence in mitigation and aggravation. Tr., 2-13-17, Pgs. 16 and 19.

At the level of discipline hearing, the AGC called Cohen as its only witness. ***During this brief examination, absolutely no evidence bearing on the level of discipline***

was introduced. Tr., February 13, 2016, Pgs. 40-57. Cohen then moved for a finding of no discipline. Tr., February 13, 2016, Pg. 58. The panel recognized that the AGC had failed to introduce evidence on the level of discipline, but denied the motion anyway, indicating its intent to later scour the evidence introduced during the misconduct phase for support of whatever discipline it intended to mete out. Tr., February 13, 2016, Pgs. 61-62.

The panel issued its sanction report and discipline order on May 4, 2017. The report purports to contain findings on the three *Lopatin* factors above that the panel had announced were irrelevant to the proceeding. The panel explicitly found that Cohen's alleged misconduct had caused no actual injury to any person or legal system, but then purported to rely on an ABA standard that recommends suspension for misconduct that, "causes injury". The panel's discipline order, issued on May 4, 2017, imposes a 180 day suspension against Cohen.

Cohen filed an appeal of the misconduct and suspension orders that is set for hearing in Lansing before the full Attorney Discipline Board at 11:00 am on August 16, 2017. The suspension has been stayed pending completion of appellate proceedings. Cohen is asking that the suspension be vacated on the basis that no attorney misconduct can be found in the filing of factually true and legally meritorious pleadings. The AGC has asked the ADB to increase Cohen's suspension, making the odd but revealing assertion in its brief that, "Cohen's vision of a legal culture over which the First Amendment reigns supreme is at odds with years of constitutional jurisprudence."